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The Open Methods of Coordination as Amplifi er 
for EU Soft Law:
The case of EU Youth Policy
BY PAUL COPELAND* and BERYL TER HAAR**
Abstract. The legally non-binding nature of the EU’s Open Method of Coordination (OMC) has sparked a lively 
scholarly debate that includes, amongst other things, research about its function and effectiveness in conjunction 
with hard law and the integration capacity created by different governance structures (hybridity). This paper 
contributes to this debate via an analysis of EU integration within the fi eld of Youth Policy. Contrary to existing 
research that examines hybrid structures in which the OMC interacts with hard law, EU Youth Policy has developed 
a hybrid structure in which the OMC mainly interacts with soft law. Our conclusion is that the developed hybrid 
structure has resulted in an incremental and coherent EU Youth Policy in which the OMC plays a crucial role.
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1. INTRODUCTION
As a legally non-binding mode of new governance, the EU’s open method of coordination 
(OMC) has sparked a lively scholarly debate with respect to its functioning as a European 
integration instrument1 and its effectiveness in creating policy change within the Member 
States.2 Current approaches to analysing the OMC usually examine it in isolation of other 
EU governance tools, however, “the OMC is one among a panoply of different instruments”3 
to govern an EU policy fi eld. In response, the theory of hybridity acknowledges the co-
existence and engagement of hard law and new modes of governance (particularly the 
OMC) and explores their interaction. 
Despite this theoretical acknowledgement, existing studies have two limitations: fi rst, 
only a few empirical case studies have been conducted in exploring the theory of hybridity; 
and second, such studies are limited to the interaction of new governance (the OMC) with 
hard law.4 The latter is particularly signifi cant given that EU policy fi elds are governed by a 
wide range of instruments including hard law (regulations and directives), new governance 
1 Jonathan Zeitlin, Philippe Pochet and Lars Magnussen (eds), The Open Method of Co-
ordination in Action (Peter Lang 2005).
2 Martin Heidenreich and Jonathan Zeitlin (eds), Changing European Employment and Welfare 
Regimes (Routledge 2009).
3 Caroline de la Porte and Philippe Pochet, ‘Introduction’, in Caroline de la Porte and Philippe 
Pochet (eds), Building Social Europe through the Open Method of Co-ordination (Peter Lang 2003) 1.
4 Gráinne de Búrca and Joanne Scott, Law and New Governance in the EU and the US (Hart 
Publishing 2006).
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(OMC) and traditional soft law (e.g. action programmes, recommendations and resolutions). 
Consequently the current theory of hybridity and its empirical case studies provide a narrow 
understanding of EU governance and the interaction of its various components. The focus 
on hard law, the OMC, and their interaction, constructs a dichotomy in which the OMC and 
thereby all EU soft law are considered to be relatively weak. However, this may turn out to 
be different, when the interaction between all these instruments (hard law, the OMC and 
soft law) is taken into account. In particular, this may be the case in policy areas in which 
there is little or no governance via hard law and mainly governance via the OMC and 
traditional soft law.
Therefore, the aim of this paper is to examine the function of the OMC as an integration 
instrument by its interaction with the broad range of EU governance instruments, including 
hard law and soft law. For this we focus on the fi eld of EU Youth Policy – a policy fi eld 
which is identifi ed, in part, as being governed by the OMC.5 EU Youth Policy is particularly 
interesting because it is one of the seven fl agship initiatives within the Europe 2020 
Strategy. 
This paper is structured as follows: the fi rst section explains the theory of hybridity. In 
comparison to the existing theory, we argue that it is possible to conceive hybridity much 
more broadly to include a wider range of EU integration instruments. Sections two and 
three concern the case study of the paper – EU Youth Policy – to demonstrate the hybridity 
of the OMC with hard law and more signifi cantly soft law. Section two historically analyses 
the development of EU Youth Policy, while Section three provides an inventory and an 
analysis of the integration instruments utilised to govern EU Youth Policy. From these two 
sections we are able to determine how the instruments have interacted over time within the 
policy fi eld. The fi nal section refl ects on what the hybrid structure within EU Youth Policy 
implies for the integration capacity of the OMC in this particular fi eld. Integration capacity 
in this context is understood as being able to infl uence Member States’ domestic policies. In 
this paper this is measured by the positive and negative incentives that are created by the 
use of the OMC as the main driver to further EU integration within EU Youth Policy. 
2. HYBRIDITY AND METHODOLOGY
Gap-thesis and theory of hybrid structures
As a new governance instrument, the OMC has been conceptualised in terms of the gap-
thesis, which provides an explanation for the development of patterns of new governance. It 
argues that formal mechanisms of regulation are either blind or unable to deal with: the 
changing practice of governance that includes the participation of the affected actors 
(stakeholders); the emphasis on transparency and policy learning; and ongoing evaluations 
and reviews.6 In fact, this blindness not only applies to hard law, but also to traditional EU 
soft law.7 In response, the emergence of new modes of governance is an attempt to address 
some of the failings of traditional modes of governance and can be distinguished from both 
5 Brigid Laffan and Colin Shaw, ‘Classifying and Mapping the OMC in Different Policy Areas’ 
(2005) paper 02/D09 NEWGOV – New Mode of Governance 14.
6 De Búrca and Scott  4.
7 Susanna Borrás and Keneth Jacobsson, ‘The Open Method of Co-ordination and New 
Governance Patterns in the EU’ (2004) 11/2 Journal of European Public Policy 185.
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traditional hard and soft law. The EU’s OMC is argued to be archetypical of these new 
modes of governance. 
While the gap-thesis provides an explanation as to why new forms of governance have 
emerged, the theory of hybrid structures aims to provide a better understanding of how 
these forms of new governance coexist and thereby interact in a policy area with mainly 
traditional hard law. In this respect Trubek and Trubek distinguish between three varieties 
of coexistence, i.e. situations in which new governance and hard law operate in the same 
policy domain.8 Thus, when new governance and hard law simultaneously operate towards 
a common objective, but they have not merged together, they are complementary. When 
newer forms of governance are designed to perform the same task as legal regulation and 
are thought to do it better, or there appears to be a necessary choice between the two, they 
are rivalry. They are transformative if a confi guration is not only complementary, but also 
integrates into a single system in which the functioning of each element is necessary for the 
successful operation of the other. Furthermore, Trubek and Trubek note that hybrid 
structures can be consciously designed to get the best policy outcome of new governance 
and hard law.9 Hybrid structures can also gradually grow into a complementary structure or 
merge into a new constellation. Sometimes this is done intentionally to displace older forms 
of governance, but it can also occur unintentionally as new governance patterns make it 
hard to deploy existing modes of governance. In this particular constellation the new and 
older forms of governance coexist as rivals. Hybrid forms of governance can have important 
implications for the success or failure of a policy area. In this respect, Trubek and Trubek 
give as examples the successful coexistence of new governance (e.g. the OMC) and hard 
law in the Green Tier Policy of Wisconsin and the failed coexistence of the EU’s Stability 
and Growth Pact.10
In summary, the theory of hybridity is about how two or more European integration 
governance instruments interact with each other. Despite this, within the current literature 
there has been an emphasis on analysing the interaction between the OMC and hard law, 
but in practice EU policy areas are governed by a variety of instruments, including the 
OMC, hard law and soft law. Secondly, what Trubek and Trubek do not directly address, 
but which is also signifi cant for hybrid structures, is the overall capacity of a hybrid 
structure to create incentives for Member State engagement and activity. From this 
perspective, we argue that both the integration capacity and the incentives for Member 
States to engage in a policy area are stronger when the governance instruments interact 
positively, either by complementarity or transformation, and are weaker when the 
governance instruments compete for dominance. We therefore argue that to fully capture 
the integration capacity of a policy fi eld, it is necessary to determine the interaction structure 
of all instruments involved in a policy area. Therefore an analysis of a policy area requires 
this broader scope and the following three hybrid structures can be defi ned: 
– complementarity: two or more integration instruments working for common goals,
– rivalry: two or more integration instruments competing for dominance,
– transformation: two or more instruments merge into a new hybrid process.
  8 David M. Trubek and Louise Trubek, ‘New Governance and & Legal Regulation: Comple-
mentarity, Rivalry, and Transformation’ (2007) 13/3 Columbian Journal of European Law 543.
  9 ibid.
10 ibid 557–558.
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This broadens the scope of the theory to the whole range of EU integration instruments, 
hence it enables the study of the interaction of similar integration instruments – for example, 
two directives, two action programmes or two OMCs. Broadening the theory of hybridity is 
particularly relevant to the increasing tendency within the EU to coordinate governance.11 
Methodology of defi ning hybrid structures
In this paper we apply the broader theory of hybridity to the fi eld of EU Youth policy. This 
fi eld is interesting since it is a policy that is governed by the OMC and represents a policy 
area that is currently silent in the EU. The analysis of the hybrid structure of EU Youth 
Policy is done in two stages: fi rstly, the historical development of EU Youth Policy; and 
secondly, an analysis of its legal instruments. 
The historical development of EU Youth Policy unpacks the current policy mix within 
the EU. The historical analysis is indicative of how the governance framework has evolved, 
but it does not provide an overview of the actual instruments – which create the incentives 
– involved within EU Youth Policy. In the second stage of our analysis we identify the 
instruments operationalised within EU Youth Policy. Since we are concerned with EU 
integration instruments, we selected only those instruments that address the Member States 
directly. Therefore, the opinions of the European Parliament, the Green and White Papers of 
the Commission and the Presidency Conclusions of the European Council were all excluded. 
The identifi ed instruments are ordered by the type of instrument (directive, action 
programme, resolution, OMC, etc.), analysed for the policy action they address, and put 
into chronological order. Such an overview is necessary to identify which instruments are 
currently involved with EU Youth Policy and therefore need to be analysed on the hybrid 
structure they create, which is the subject of the fi nal section of the paper. To identify the 
type of hybrid structure that is created we analyse how the instruments interact with each 
other, with the OMC in the centre, since we are interested in the function of this instrument 
in particular. 
Finally, an analysis is made of the incentives created by the instruments used to govern 
the area of youth. In general there are two ways by which the Member States are encouraged 
to take EU measures into account when developing their own policies: either by positive 
incentives or by compliance mechanisms. As for the positive incentives we identify three 
mechanisms: partial or full fi nancial support; procedural or practical support of the EU; and 
support in learning or broadening knowledge. With respect to compliance we identify three 
mechanisms: the submission of progress or implementation reports by the Member States to 
the Commission; evaluation by the Commission; and judicial review by the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ).
Depending on the type of hybrid structure created by the framework resolution, these 
ways of infl uencing Member States either weaken each other (when rivalry) or strengthen 
each other (when complementary or merged by transformative hybridity). 
3. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF EU YOUTH POLICY
When tracing the subject of youth in EU treaties, we fi nd the fi rst offi cial reference in the 
1957 EEC-Treaty. Article 50 of this treaty provides that Member States shall, within the 
11 Keneth Armstrong, ‘EU Social Policy and the Governance Architecture of Europe 2020’ 
(2012) 18/3 Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research 285–300.
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framework of a joint programme, encourage the exchange of young workers. With the 
Treaty of Maastricht12 this provision was complemented with Article 126 TEC, which deals 
with youth and education and the participation of young people in democratic life in 
Europe. Although this seems to cover a broad scope, the competence to deal with the 
subject is limited to the encouraging of the cooperation between the Member States and, if 
necessary, by supporting and supplementing their action, while fully respecting the 
responsibility of the Member States for the content of teaching and the organisation of 
education systems and their cultural and linguistic diversity. More specifi cally within both 
provisions the competence is limited to supportive and supplementary measures.13 Thus, 
although the personal scope of the EU institutions with respect to young persons widened 
– from young workers only to youth in general – the material scope became smaller – 
education – and the competence to deal with this became weaker since article 126 TEC 
gives the EU institutions no formal law-making powers.14 This has remained unchanged 
during the revisions of Amsterdam15 (article 149 TEC); Nice16 (article 149 TEC); and 
Lisbon17 (article 165 TFEU).
It is in this formal context that EU Youth Policy developed during the 1990s when it 
gained political momentum at the transnational level. This began with the Commission’s 
White Paper entitled Growth, Competitiveness and Employment, which drew attention to 
the issue of unemployment, including the issue of youth unemployment.18 In the 
Commission’s 1994 White Paper ‘European Social Policy’, it was noted that “EU-wide 
youth unemployment stands at over 20%, as against 13% in the US and 5% in Japan”.19 In 
response, the White Paper proposed a number of initiatives relating to the youth 
employment, and training and education – such as a Union-wide guarantee that noone under 
the age of 18 can be unemployed, the elimination of basic illiteracy for school leavers, and 
the improvement of education, training and vocational training.20 While many of these 
initiatives had already been addressed in action programmes and Council resolutions (see 
12 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Treaty of Maastricht [1992] OJ C 
325/5.
13 See Article 6 (education, vocational training, youth and sport) TFEU. Since Article 47 TFEU 
stipulates that the Member States shall, within a framework of a joint programme, encourage the 
exchange of young workers, the competence in this context is also limited to supportive and 
supplementary measures, rather than a shared competence as is more general within the provisions of 
the Internal Market.
14 Bettina Lange and Nafsika Alexiadou, ‘New Forms of European Union Governance in the 
Education Sector? A Preliminary Analysis of the Open Method of Coordination’ (2007) 6/4 European 
Educational Research Journal 321.
15 Treaty of Amsterdam, Amending the Treaty of the European Union, the Treaties Establishing 
the European Communities and Certain Related Acts [1997] OJ L-2985.
16 Treaty of Nice, Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the 
European Communities and Certain Related Acts [2001] OJ C 80/01.
17 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the 
European Community [2007] OJ C306/01.
18 European Commission (1993) White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness, Employment: The 
Challenges and Ways Forward in the 21st Century. COM (93) 700 Final.
19 European Commission (1994) European Social Policy – A Way Forward for the Union: 
A White Paper. COM (94) 333 fi nal.
20 Commission, ‘EU youth report. An EU strategy for youth – Investing and empowering. 
Commission staff working document accompanying the Communication’ SEC (2009) 549 fi nal, 17.
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next section), they were fi rst coherently brought together within the two White Papers. 
Moreover, by bringing these initiatives together, the White Papers were able to make a 
signifi cant difference in that they shifted the narrative of EU employment and social policy 
from one which concerned workers and the establishment and protection of their rights, to 
one in which unemployment and the increase of employment were to be the focus of 
attention;21 a shift that became tangible with the introduction of the European Employment 
Strategy (EES) in the Treaty of Amsterdam. Although not mentioned in the Treaty itself, the 
employment guidelines make it clear that the strategy also concerns youth policies.22 In 
order to reduce youth unemployment, Member States are required to develop employment 
friendly strategies with the overall aim of ensuring “every unemployed young person is [to 
be offered] a new start before reaching six months of unemployment, in the form of training, 
retraining, work practice, a job or other employability measure”.23 Member States are also 
required to ease the transition from school to work, particularly for young people from poor 
backgrounds. As such, they are required to improve the quality of their education systems, 
and where appropriate, develop apprenticeship training.
The inclusion of youth in the EES appears to be the beginning of a signifi cant policy 
activism within the fi eld of Youth Policy and its mainstreaming into other existing policies, 
among which are participation policies and social inclusion. Moreover, it denotes the 
emergence of a genuine EU Youth Policy that was broad in scope. For instance, on 8 
February 1999 the European Council and the Ministers responsible for Youth adopted a 
resolution on youth participation that emphasised the importance of young people taking an 
active part in social, political, cultural and economic life,24 whilst on 23 November 1999 the 
Youth Council established guidelines including a cross-sectorial approach to youth 
questions and a policy based on involving young people. These were to underpin policy 
cooperation regarding youth and were supported by the European Council’s Lisbon Strategy 
of March 2000 and the Laeken Declaration of December 2001. While the former offers a 
wider context for Youth policy, namely that of employment and social inclusion, both 
including education, the latter broadens the policy context by emphasising participation 
issues, the needs to increase employment and combat social exclusion across the EU, and 
the fostering of economic and social cohesion. 
It is within this context that in 2001 a further step was taken towards developing an 
all-encompassing EU Youth Policy with the publication of the EU Commission’s White 
Paper ‘A New Impetus for European Youth’.25 The White Paper proposed the appointment 
of a national coordinator from each Member State as a Commission representative for 
youth-related issues. It outlined four priority areas: fi rst, the introduction of new ways of 
enabling young people to participate in public life; second, the improvement of information 
on European issues for the young; third, to encourage voluntary service; and fourth, to 
increase the knowledge of youth-related issues. The White Paper also proposed to take the 
youth dimension into account much more thoroughly when developing other relevant 
21 Samantha Velluti, New Governance and the European Employment Strategy (Routledge 
2010).
22 European Council (1998) Council Resolution of 15 December 1997 on the 1998 Employment 
Guidelines. OJ/1998/C30/1.
23 ibid 4.
24 European Council (1999) Resolution on Youth Participation. OJ/1999/C42/1.
25 European Commission (2001). A New Impetus for European Youth – White Paper COM 
(2001) 681 fi nal, 21 November 2001.
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policies, such as education and training, employment and social inclusion, health and anti-
discrimination.26 On the basis of the four priority areas outlined in the White Paper, the 
Council established a framework for European co-operation in the fi eld of youth.27 
As a follow up to its 2001 White Paper, in October 2004 the Commission issued a 
Communication.28 The Communication served as a stocktaking exercise of the achievements 
of the framework at both the EU and the Member State levels. It demonstrates the 
considerable policy activism that had been achieved to date in the area of Youth Policy and 
its mainstreaming throughout the EU, particularly in other OMCs such as the EES, 
education, and social inclusion. Indeed the Communication argues that Youth Policy is 
governed by its own OMC, but that such an OMC is different because unlike other policy 
areas, the objectives remain qualitative and their implementation is not the subject of 
national plans of action coordinated at the European Level.29 To provide greater coherence 
and consistency to the various initiatives in the fi eld of Youth Policy, the Council adopted 
the European Youth Pact in March 2005 as part of the revised Lisbon Strategy.30 The pact 
focussed on three areas: employment integration and social advancement; education, 
training and mobility; and the reconciliation of work and family life. The aims of the 
European Youth Pact were to be pursued within the EU’s Lisbon Strategy and focus on the 
three previously mentioned OMCs. In this respect, the area of Youth Policy provides a good 
example of the practice of mainstreaming within the EU and the OMC mode of governance.
In response to the EU’s New Social Agenda launched in 2008, the Commission 
launched in April 2009 its Communication ‘Youth – Investing and Empowering’.31 The 
Communication represents one of the most detailed analyses of the current situation of 
young people across the EU and, for the period 2010–2018, invited both the Member States 
and the Commission to cooperate in the fi eld of youth by means of a renewed OMC. It 
proposed a cross-sectorial approach with both short and long term objectives, involving all 
key policy areas that affect the EU’s young people. The Communication also invited all 
Member States to organise a permanent and regular dialogue (structured dialogue) with 
young people. Furthermore, via its Communication the Commission also encouraged a 
more research and evidence-based youth policy. Following the Communication, the Council 
adopted the 2009 resolution on a renewed framework for European cooperation in the fi eld 
of youth (2010–2018).32 The resolution defi nes one overarching objective, namely to enable 
all young women and men to make the best of their potential to be achieved via two sub-
objectives: 1) more and equal opportunities for young people in education and in the labour 
26 ibid 18–21.
27 Resolution of the Council and of the representatives of the Governments of the Member 
States, meeting within the Council of 27 June 2002 regarding the framework of European cooperation 
in the youth fi eld [2002] OJ C168/2.
28 ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council: Follow-up to the White Paper on a 
New Impetus for European Youth: Evaluation of Activities Conducted in the Framework of 
Cooperation in the Youth Field’ COM (2004) 694.
29 ibid 7.
30 European Council Youth Pact [2005] OJ/2006/C70/1.
31 EU Commission Communication ‘EU youth report. An EU strategy for youth – Investing and 
empowering. Commission staff working document accompanying the Communication’ [2009]SEC 
(2009b) 549 fi nal, 17.
32 European Council (2009) Council Resolution on a renewed framework for European 
cooperation in the youth fi eld (2010-2018) OJ [2009] C311/1.
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market; and 2) active citizenship, social inclusion and solidarity of young people. The 
objectives are underpinned by eight fi elds of action in which initiatives should be 
undertaken: education and training; employment and entrepreneurship; health and well 
being; participation; voluntary activities; social inclusion; youth and the world; and 
creativity and culture.
In addition to the 2009 Framework Resolution, the issue of youth is also part of Europe 
2020, the vehicle taking forward the EU’s policy commitments over the next decade. In 
Europe 2020 the area of youth is not only incorporated into the integrated policy guidelines 
that concern employment, education, training and skills, and social inclusion/poverty,33 but 
it forms one of the fl agship initiatives. The seven fl agship initiatives are jointly undertaken 
by EU and national actors and are steered by the European Commission – in the area of 
Youth the initiative is called ‘Youth on the Move’. The focus of this initiative is to increase 
the chances of young people in fi nding a job by enhancing student and trainee mobility and 
improving the quality and attractiveness of education and training in Europe.34 Since this 
matches several of the action fi elds of the 2009 Framework Resolution (Education, 
employment and participation), it has essentially been incorporated into this wider structure 
and as such, further strengthens the political competence of the 2009 Framework Resolution. 
Furthermore, with young people being one of the worst affected by the economic crisis, 
political support for the EU to step up in this policy fi eld continues. This is illustrated by 
the recent initiatives such as Youth on the Move and the Youth employment Package 
(including the Youth Guarantee), which are both part of wider EU strategies (Europe 2020 
and the EES, respectively) and are incorporated in the EU Youth Strategy.35
In summary it can be said that the legal competence, i.e. the basis in the EU treaty for 
the development of an overall EU Youth Policy is small and limited. Despite this, its 
political competence is strong since it grasps momenta created in other EU policy fi elds and 
broader EU strategies, such as the EES, the Lisbon Strategy, the Laeken Declaration, the 
2008 New Social Policy Agenda, and Europe 2020. Each of these addresses issues 
(employment, social inclusion, education and participation) that form the impetus of the 
2009 Framework Resolution.
4. INVENTORY OF EU YOUTH POLICY ACQUIS
The above section makes clear that the 2009 Framework Resolution forms the core 
component of the EU’s Youth Policy. Therefore we take this framework resolution as a 
starting point to identify the instruments that form the acquis communautaire of EU Youth 
Policy. In total we identifi ed 101 instruments (overview is available on request) that were 
adopted between 1961 and 2010. Such instruments include directives, action programmes, 
resolutions and OMCs (see Figure 1). There is a relatively small group of instruments 
indicated as “other”. This group contains instruments such as Council Conclusions, 
33 European Council, Council Decision of 21 October 2010 on guidelines for the Employment 
policies of the Member States. (OJ [2010] L 308/46).
34 European Commission Initiative Youth on the Move: An initiative to unleash the potential of 
young people to achieve smart, sustainable and inclusive growth in the European Union. [2010] 
(Comm 2010/477 fi nal).
35 European Commission Communication [2013a] COM/2013/477/fi nal and European Commis-
sion Initiative [2013b] COM/2013/144/ fi nal.
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declarations, the decisions and regulations dealing with the European Social Fund and the 
two EU charters concerning fundamental rights (1989 for workers and 2000 for the EU). 
Figure 1 provides an overview of the number and type of instruments in EU Youth 
Policy adopted for the period of analysis (from 1960s to 2010).36 Figure 2 gives an overview 
of EU Youth Policy activism in the eight fi elds of action of the 2009 Framework Resolution. 
The number of actions in this fi eld is higher than the number of instruments in Figure 1. 
The deviation is a result of some instruments addressing more than one action policy and 
this is particularly the case of those instruments adopted during the last period of analysis 
(2000–2010). Together, Figures 1 and 2 reveal several traits within the fi eld of EU Youth 
Policy. Generally speaking, over time, EU policy activism has increased, but most of that 
increase (approximately 50 per cent) occurred during the last period, 2000–2010. This 
increase resembles the political momentum EU Youth Policy gained during the second half 
of the 1990s and its consolidation in the renewed framework for 2010–2018. Furthermore, 
with the exception of two directives, Figure 1 reveals that the acquis communautaire of 
Youth Policy is comprised of legally non-binding measures. The two directives are both 
adopted in the action fi eld ‘health & well-being’ and concern health and safety at work – a 
social policy area that is predominantly governed by EU hard law.37 Looking more closely 
36 The inventory also includes instruments from the period after 2010, however, since we 
decided to present the development in periods of ten years, the inclusion of this data in the fi gures is 
decisive in the sense that it only includes three years. In these three years, nine instruments have been 
adopted which continue the line of development that began in the fi rst decade of 2000. 
37 Beryl Peter Haar and Paul Copeland, ‘What are the Future Prospects of the European Social 
Model? An Analysis of EU Equal Opportunities and Employment Policy’ (2010) 16/3 European Law 
Journal 273–291.
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at the typology of EU instruments used in EU Youth Policy, we can see that over time, the 
variety of instruments increases from two in the 1960s (action programmes and a 
commission recommendation) to fi ve in the 1990s,38 and fi nally to a more representative 
variety of four instruments between 2001–2010.39 
Figure 1 also demonstrates a shift in the typology of instruments used – during the fi rst 
three decades (1961–1990) action programmes are the most popular instruments, while they 
become marginalised during the last period (2001–2010) in favour of Council Resolutions 
and OMCs. 
Figure 2. EU Youth Policy activism in eight fi elds of action
Figure 2 confi rms the increase in EU Youth Policy activism in the last period (2000–
2010), yet, it shows a signifi cant difference in the intensity of policy activism. The action 
fi elds ‘youth and the world’ and ‘creativity & culture’ lag considerably behind the other 
fi elds. Despite there being twice as much activity in the action fi elds ‘health & well-being’ 
and ‘voluntary activities’, these two fi elds still demonstrate a relatively moderate level of 
activism compared to the action fi elds ‘social inclusion’, ‘participation’, ‘education & 
training’ and ‘employment & entrepreneurship’. Only in the latter two action fi elds has the 
EU been considerably active all the time. The fi rst one even demonstrates a remarkable 
upsurge of activism during the 1980s. This upsurge can be contributed to the successive 
action programmes (called: Petra) that concerned the preparation of young people for work 
and their transition from education to working life that started in 1976 and gained 
38 This is due to the adoption of one of the two exceptional directives.
39 This variety would be more when the category ‘other’ were subdivided in specifi c instruments, 
however, the increasing number in this category could be considered as a signal for such. 
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momentum in the 1980s when (youth) unemployment increased across the Member States.40 
The last Petra programme was adopted in 1991, after which its main objective – having 
education and vocational training better attuned to the skills and needs of the labour market 
– was incorporated into the employment strategy.
With respect to the action fi eld of social inclusion, it is worth noting that the EU has 
been active in this fi eld since the 1970s. Such EU programmes rarely single out target 
groups, unless it is clear that a group is threatened by poverty or exclusion, such as migrants 
or children of families already living in poverty. Although young people are not named as a 
specifi c target group, the actions of the Member States targeting young people are supported 
by the EU poverty programme. As such, these programmes indirectly support youth policy 
and are an important aspect of EU Youth Policy. Despite this, we have only found evidence 
of this in relation to one programme41 and therefore confi ned the inventory to this 
programme only. Hence, it is only during the last period (2000–2010) that the policy fi eld 
of combating social exclusion becomes tangible to the EU policy agenda. This development 
can be attributed to the Treaty of Nice,42 which clarifi ed the competence of the EU in the 
fi eld, and the Lisbon Strategy, which, as described above, included a social (cohesion) 
dimension in its new EU strategy for 2010. Consequently, the action fi eld ‘social inclusion’ 
becomes more visible in EU Youth Policy and vice versa, resulting in a better streamlining 
of the problems of young people in social inclusion policies.
The strong increase of policy activism during the last period (2000–2010) in the action 
fi elds ‘education & vocational training’ and ‘employment & entrepreneurship’ can also be 
attributed to the Lisbon Strategy, as well as its re-launch in 2005 and its continuation in 
Europe 2020. Although both action fi elds have often been addressed together in the fi eld of 
youth, this is even more so after 2000. A closer inspection reveals that of the nineteen 
activities in the action fi eld ‘employment & entrepreneurship’, two activities exclusively 
deal with this action fi eld, while ten activities also include education, and seven include 
other action fi elds, among which four cover social inclusion. 
Although the development of the action fi eld ‘participation’ appears to keep pace with 
‘education & vocational training’ and ‘employment & entrepreneurship’ in terms of policy 
activism, in fact it follows its own path of political development: EU citizenship. The 1999 
40 Mixed Resolution concerning measures to be taken to improve the preparation of young 
people for work and to facilitate their transition from education to working life PETRA (OJ [1976] 
C308/1); Mixed Resolution concerning measures to be taken to improve the preparation of young 
people for work and to facilitate their transition from education to working life PETRA (OJ [1980] 
C23/1); Mixed Resolution concerning measures to be taken to improve the preparation of young 
people for work and to facilitate their transition from education to working life PETRA (OJ [1982] 
C193/1); Mixed Resolution extending for one year certain measures to be taken to improve the 
preparation of young people for work and to facilitate their transition from education to working life 
PETRA (OJ [1985] C328/3); 87/569/EEC: Council Decision concerning an action programme for the 
vocational training of young people and their preparation for adult and working life PETRA (OJ 
[1987] L346/31); Mixed Conclusion on the second European Community action programme (1982 to 
1987) concerning the transition of young people from education to adult and working life PETRA (OJ 
[1988] C177/1); and 91/387/EEC: Council Decision amending Decision 87/569/EEC concerning an 
action programme for the vocational training of young people and their preparation for adult and 
working life PETRA (OJ [1991] L214/69). 
41  Council Decision concerning a programme of pilot schemes and studies to combat poverty 
[1975] OJ L199/34.
42  Treaty of Nice [2001] OJ C80/1.
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resolution on youth participation makes it clear as it encourages the enabling of “young 
people to participate in all aspects of active citizenship, including their political participation 
and their mobility within the European Union, thereby involving young citizens in the 
process of further European integration”.43 This action fi eld serves two purposes: 1) to 
promote active participation of young people in societal matters; and while doing so 2) 
stimulate the inclusion of young people who are (threatened) by exclusion. As such, this 
action policy works both ways: it enhances active citizenship and reduces youth social 
exclusion.44 Moreover, it is therefore no coincidence that these two action fi elds kept pace 
with each other in the 1990s. 
Finally, what stands out in both fi gures is that over the course of time the difference 
between the number of instruments adopted in the periods deviates substantially from the 
number of action fi elds addressed in that same period. Thus while this relates to the period 
1961–1970 as 3:4, it is 10:12 in the period 1971–1980, 16:22 in the period 1981–1990, 
22:30 in the period 1991–2000, and 45:80 in the period 2001–2010. As discussed in section 
2, the increase in activism and policy actions not only signifi es the movement towards a 
genuine EU Youth Policy, it also indicates a growing coherence between the different fi elds 
of action. This can be deduced from the number of instruments that deal with actions on 
education, employment, participation and social inclusion, either by dealing with all four 
issues within one instrument, or a combination of instruments. In the fi nal section we further 
examine the effect of this coherence in policy actions with respect to the incentives they 
create for action within the Member States. 
5. THE HYBRID STRUCTURE OF EU YOUTH POLICY
It has been argued above that in contrast to the earlier piecemeal approach to the policy 
fi eld, from the second half of the 1990s there exists more coherence between the eight 
action fi elds, as illustrated in Figure 2. An example of such coherence can be found in the 
2004 Mixed Resolution on social integration with respect to young people that calls for the 
Member States “to take particular account of the measures appropriate in a social integration 
context to young people” and states that “it is desirable that there be more coherence, 
coordination and cooperation in the formulation of policies of a social nature, with particular 
regard to the youth sector”.45 Policies addressed in this resolution include education, 
mobility, employment, and social integration. Furthermore, the resolution provides a non-
exhaustive list of twelve measures to be considered by the Member States, involving the 
action fi elds social inclusion (measures i, ix, x, and xii), participation (measures ii and vii), 
education (measures iii, v, vi and xi), and employment (measure iv), whereas measure viii 
addresses all four of the action fi elds. Another example is the ‘Youth in Action’ programme 
(2007–2013)46 that replaces several separate programmes in the fi eld of education, the 
programmes to encourage the exchange of young workers, and the ‘youth for Europe’ 
programmes. Furthermore, it emphasises in Article 11 its complementarity with ‘other areas 
43 European Council Resolution on Youth Participation [1999] OJ/1999/C42/1.
44 This bilaterally can also be found in the action programmes ‘Youth for Europe’.
45 European Council Resolution of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments 
of the Member States, meeting within the Council, on social integration with regard to young people 
[2004] (doc. 9601/04 of 18 May 2004).
46 European Council Decision Establishing the Youth in Action Programme for the period 
2007–2013 [2006a] OJ/ 2006/L327/30.
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of Community action’, among which education, employment, health, and social inclusion 
feature.47 The 2006 action programme ‘Progress’ is yet another example of the growing 
coherence since it underpins the EES and the OMC on social inclusion and stresses its 
consistency and complementarity “with other Union and Community policies, instruments 
and actions”, among which are education, training and youth.48
As these examples demonstrate, the interaction between the action fi elds is more than 
just coherence. In this respect we conclude that from 2000 onwards, a hybrid structure of 
complementarity is created. The 2002 mixed resolution regarding the framework of 
European cooperation in the youth fi eld is another example of such complementarity: it 
refers and builds on previous EU initiatives and promotes an integrated approach between 
these action fi elds. Moreover, by the explicit acknowledgement that instead of having 
independent policy fi elds, Youth Policy should be complementary to other policy fi elds, we 
argue that this resolution is the fi rst step towards transformative hybridity.49 This means that 
certain thematic priorities of the specifi c youth fi eld – participation; information; voluntary 
activities; and greater understanding and knowledge of youth – are to be governed by the 
OMC, and that the youth dimension should be taken into account in other policies as well, 
including education, lifelong learning, mobility, employment and social integration, 
combating racism and xenophobia, and autonomy. 
With the interlude of the 2005 European Youth Pact, the 2009 renewed framework 
resolution for European cooperation in the fi eld of youth fi nalises the merging into one new 
hybrid process. This merging consolidates the dual approach of the 2002 framework 
involving the development of EU Youth Policies by specifi c initiatives and the promotion of 
youth issues by mainstreaming them into other fi elds. Also, the renewed framework is more 
comprehensive than the 2002 framework and the 2005 Youth Pact, since it includes all eight 
fi elds of action and it takes stock of all activities that already have been undertaken by the 
EU. We deduce this from several aspects. First, as indicated in Section 2, it defi nes one 
overarching objective (to enable all young women and men to make the best of their 
potential) that is subdivided into two more specifi c objectives: 1) to create more and equal 
opportunities for all young people in education and the labour market; and 2) to promote 
the active citizenship, social inclusion and solidarity of all young people. With this the 
framework resolution merges the two main developments within the fi eld of EU Youth 
Policy: that of education and employment which gained political momenta with the EES 
and the Lisbon Strategy; with that of participation and social inclusion which gained 
political momenta with the Laeken Declaration and the Lisbon Strategy. 
Furthermore, the 2009 Framework Resolution deliberately and explicitly names the 
eight action fi elds concerning which a dual approach should be undertaken in order to 
achieve the two interrelated sub-objectives. First, specifi c initiatives should be undertaken 
in the youth fi eld – i.e. “policies and actions specifi cally targeted at young people in areas 
such as non-formal learning, participation, voluntary activities, youth work, mobility and 
47 European Council Decision Establishing the Youth in Action Programme for the period 
2007–2013 [2006a] OJ/ 2006/L327/30.
48 European Council Decision Establishing a Programme for Employment and Social Solidarity 
[2006b] OJ/2006/L315/1.
49 European Council Resolution of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments 
of the Member States, meeting within the Council, regarding the framework of European cooperation 
in the Youth Field [2002] OJ/2002/C168/2.
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information”.50 Second, initiatives should be mainstreamed – i.e. “initiatives to enable a 
cross-sectoral approach where due account is taken of youth issues when formulating, 
implementing and evaluating policies and actions in other policy fi elds which have 
signifi cant impact on the lives of young people”.51
In fact, we deduce the aim of the 2009 Framework resolution to merge the action fi elds 
and policy initiatives in these fi elds also from the specifi c and mainstreaming initiatives 
listed in the Annex of the resolution that perfectly match the initiatives that have already 
been undertaken. More specifi cally, the framework resolution coordinates fi ve different 
governance techniques supporting all EU Youth action fi elds: reporting, dissemination and 
monitoring; evidence-based policy-making; structured dialogue; mutual learning; and the 
mobilisation of funds. Youth work is in this context considered as a support to all fi elds and 
cross-sectoral cooperation is considered as an underlying principle. These governance 
mechanisms are in addition to the mechanisms that the individual EU initiatives regarding 
each specifi c action fi eld create. Our analysis of the acquis communautaire on youth shows 
that this includes the following governance mechanisms to stimulate Member States to take 
EU Youth Policies into account:
– fi nancial support (in particular by the European Social Fund); 
– exchange of good practices, 
– challenged (by peer reviews and benchmarks), 
– persuaded (by progress reports and evaluations, but also 
– by practical support (by the Commission), and 
– forced via judicial review (by directives). 
As a result of the political strategic merger of the action fi elds and the individual 
initiatives within these action fi elds, the various governance mechanisms, those supporting 
all the fi elds and those of the individual initiatives, have also merged. Hence, since they are 
applied within the same policy fi eld, they work together for the same goals, within the same 
context simultaneously. As such they work to each other’s strengths and together build 
pressure on the Member States to take youth matters into account when developing national 
laws and policies in the various action fi elds. Within the action fi eld of employment and 
entrepreneurship for instance, eleven policy initiatives cover the fi eld, which are governed 
by several integration instruments that employ different incentives and compliance 
mechanisms. Among the integration instruments we fi nd the EES, two mixed resolutions, 
one mixed conclusion and a directive. Together these instruments hold a panoply of 
incentives, including fi nancial support (Progress and ESF), support in learning by 
dissemination of information and practices, and practical support by the Commission. They 
also apply a whole range of compliance mechanisms, among which are monitoring and 
evaluations by the Commission, progress reports, and judicial review. 
50 Article 3(i) European Council Framework Resolution on a renewed framework for European 
cooperation in the youth fi eld (2010–2018) [2009] OJ C311/1.
51 Article 3(ii) European Council Framework Resolution on a renewed framework for European 
cooperation in the youth fi eld (2010–2018) [2009] OJ C311/1.
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6. CONCLUSION
This article has focused on the interaction of the EU’s OMC with other integration 
instruments, notably hard law and traditional soft law. Central to this analysis it has been to 
further understand the meaning of the OMC as an integration instrument. For this we chose 
the fi eld of EU Youth Policy. While there is limited competence for the EU to act in this 
fi eld, the historical analysis has shown that on the political level, the issue has grabbed its 
moments, which has resulted in a coherent programme addressing the issue of Youth from 
eight different policy angles. 
This coherence is also found on the instrumental level in the 2009 framework 
resolution. Signifi cant in this respect is the changing type of integration instruments to 
operationalise EU Youth Policy: from mainly action programmes to a wider range of 
instruments including policy guiding resolutions and OMCs. As the regulatory mechanism 
of the framework resolution, the OMC played an important role in creating this coherence, 
since it functions as a spinal-cord that connects the eight action fi elds. It does so on two 
levels: fi rst, on a policy level by addressing the different action fi elds in relation to each 
other; and second, on an instrumental level by merging the different instruments used to 
further the integration of the different action fi elds in order to achieve the two main goals of 
the resolution.
The result of the merger of the policy goals and integration instruments is that each 
action fi eld creates a stimulus package of positive incentives and compliance mechanisms 
to infl uence the activities of the Member States in the area of youth. Moreover, the iterative 
nature of the OMC has created a cycle of three years by which the objectives can be 
reviewed and the action priorities changed (a rolling agenda), enabling the EU Youth 
Strategy to continue its development and incorporate new initiatives within the basic 
structure.
A particularly interesting factor of the EU Youth Policy is that it illustrates that the 
OMC not only interacts with EU hard law, such as directives, yet it also interacts with soft 
law, among which we also fi nd action programmes and policy guiding resolutions. Our 
analysis shows that the strength of the OMC lies not so much in its individual governance 
capacities, instead it lies in what it can create in its interaction with other integration 
instruments (coordination of governance). Although this will differ per policy fi eld since it 
is also highly subjective to the political setting, however, what our study of EU Youth 
Policy illustrates is that when the political willingness is there, the EU can undertake a great 
amount, even when the legal possibilities are limited. In what it can create depends on the 
instruments the EU chooses. With the use of mainly action programmes (read: fi nancial 
support), the EU achieved little more than piecemeal activities to address the situation of 
the young. The OMC on the other hand functioned as an amplifi er merging in itself non-
signifi cant soft law integration instruments, into a signifi cant coherent programme 
addressing the situation of young people. Moreover, as a result of this merger on a policy 
and instrumental level, a programme was developed that is underpinned by a wide variety 
of stimulus including incentives and pressures for Member States to comply with the 
programme when dealing with the subject on a national level. 
More generally, in conclusion, what our study demonstrates is that in policy areas in 
which the EU has a limited competence, overtime OMC-type governance can make a 
signifi cant contribution to both broadening and deepening integration within the fi eld.
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